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Abstract
We study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the
sellers has private information about her value. There are two identical buyers and another
seller, whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations
of the informed seller. We consider two innite horizon games, with public and private
simultaneous one-sided o¤ers respectively and simultaneous responses. We show that there
is a stationary perfect Bayesequilibrium for both models such that prices in all transactions
converge to the same value as the discount factor goes to 1.
JEL Classication Numbers: C78, D82
Keywords: Bilateral Bargaining, Incomplete information, Outside options, Coase con-
jecture.
1 Introduction
This paper studies a small market in which one of the players has private information about
her valuation. As such, it is a rst step in combining the literature on incomplete information
with that on market outcomes obtained through decentralised bilateral bargaining.
We shall discuss the relevant literature in detail later on in the introduction. Here we
summarise the motivation for studying this problem.
One of the most important features in the study of bargaining is the role of outside op-
tions in determining the bargaining solution. There have been several di¤erent approaches
to this issue, starting with treating alternatives to the current bargaining game as exoge-
nously given and always available. Accounts of negotiation directed towards practitioners and
policy-oriented academics, like Rai¤as masterly The Art and Science of Negotiation",([32])
have emphasised the key role of the Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreementand
mentioned the role of searching for such alternatives in preparing for negotiations. Search
for outside options has also been considered, as well as search for bargaining partners in a
general coalition formation context.
Real world examples of such search for outside options are abound. For example, rms
that receive (public) takeover bids seek to generate other (also public) o¤ers in order to
improve their bargaining position. Takeovers are an instance also of public one-sided o¤ers,
where all the o¤ers are by the buyer. The housing market is another example; there is a
given (at any time) supply of sellers and buyers who are interested in a particular kind of
house make (private) o¤ers to the sellers of the houses they are interested in, one at a time.
(This is, for instance, the example used in [25].)
Private targeted o¤ers are prevalent in industry as well, for joint ventures and mergers.
For example, the book [1] is concerned with the joint venture negotiations in the 1980s, in
which Air Products, Air Liquide and British Oxygen were buyers and DuPont, Dow Chemical
and Monsanto were sellers (of a particular kind of membrane technology). The nal outcome
of these negotiations were two joint ventures and one acquisition.
Proceeding more or less in parallel, there has been considerable work on bargaining with
incomplete information. The major success of this work has been the complete analysis of
the bargaining game in which the seller has private information about the minimum o¤er
she is willing to accept and the buyer, with only the common knowledge of the probability
distribution from which the sellers reservation price is drawn, makes repeated o¤ers which
the seller can accept or reject; each rejection takes the game to another period and time is
discounted at a common rate by both parties. With the roles of the seller and buyer reversed,
this has also been part of the development of the foundations of dynamic monopoly and the
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Coase conjecture. Other, more complicated, models of bargaining have also been formulated
(including by one of us), with two-sided o¤ers and two-sided incomplete information, but
these have not usually yielded the clean results of the game with one-sided o¤ers and one-
sided incomplete information.
Whilst this need not necessarily be a reason for studying this particular game, it does
suggest that if we desire to embed bargaining in a more complex market setting with private
information, it is rational for us, the modellers, to minimise the extent of complexity associ-
ated with the bargaining to focus on the changes introduced by adding endogenous outside
options, as we intend to do here.
Our model therefore takes the basic problem of a seller with private information and
an uninformed buyer and adds another buyer-seller pair; here the new sellers valuation is
di¤erent from the informed sellers and commonly known and the buyers valuations are
identical. Each seller has one good and each buyer wants at most one good. This is the
simplest extension of the basic model that gives rise to outside options for each player,
though unlike the literature on exogenous outside options, only one buyer can deviate from
the incomplete information bargaining to take his outside option with the other seller (if this
other seller accepts the o¤er), since each seller only has one good to sell.
In our model, buyers make o¤ers simultaneously, each buyer choosing only one seller.1
Sellers also respond simultaneously, accepting at most one o¤er. A buyer whose o¤er is
accepted by a seller leaves the market with the seller and the remaining players play the
one-sided o¤ers game with or without asymmetric information. We consider both the cases
where buyerso¤ers are public, so the continuation strategies can condition on both o¤ers
in a given period, and private, when only the proposer and the recipient of an o¤er know
what it is and the only public information is the set of players remaining in the game. Our
analysis explores whether a Perfect Bayes Equilibrium similar to that found in the two-player
asymmetric information game continues to hold with alternative partners on both sides of
the market and with di¤erent conditions on observability of o¤ers.
The equilibrium we describe is in (non-degenerate) randomized behavioral strategies (as
in the two-player game). As agents become patient enough, in equilibrium competition
always takes place for the seller whose valuation is commonly known. The equilibrium
behavior of beliefs is similar to the two-player asymmetric information game and the same
across public and private o¤ers. However, the o¤-path behaviour sustaining this equilibrium
is di¤erent and has to take into account many more possible deviations. The path of beliefs
also di¤ers once an out-of-equilibrium choice occurs. The case of private o¤ers is quite
interesting. For example a buyer who o¤ers to the informed seller might see his o¤er rejected
1Simultaneous o¤ers extensive forms probably capture the essence of competition best.
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but his expectation that the other o¤er has been accepted is belied when he observes all
players remain in the market. He is then unsure of whether the other buyer has deviated
and made an o¤er to the informed seller, which the informed seller has rejected, or an o¤er
to the seller with commonly known valuation. The beliefs have to be constructed with some
care to make sure the play gets back to the equilibrium path (and to be plausible).
The interesting asymptotic characterisation obtained by taking the limit of the equilib-
rium prices, as the discount factor goes to 1, is that, despite the asymmetric information
and two heterogeneous sellers, the di¤erent distributions of prices collapse to a single price
that is consistent with an extended Coase conjecture.2
In the two-player game, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is unique in the gapcase. In
our competitive setting, this is not true, at least for public o¤ers. We include an example.
The intuition behind these results can be explained in the following way. In the bench-
mark case, when one of the sellersvaluations is known to be H and the other M , in the
Walrasian setting there will be excess demand at any prices p 2 (M;H). This would suggest
that the prices should move towards H. However, this depends on the nature of the market
interactions. (In an alternating o¤ers extensive form, [7], this does not happen either for
public or private o¤ers, and the two give di¤erent results.) We model an explicit trading pro-
tocol with simultaneous, one-sided o¤ers made by the buyers. As  ! 1, the o¤ers converge
toH and the trade takes place immediately. It is generally supposed that simultaneous o¤ers
capture the essence of competition (a la Bertrand) but here the result is true in conjunction
with one-sided o¤ers and the earlier cited work shows it does not hold if sellers also make
o¤ers.
The private information case builds on the known results for the two-player game as well
as using the intuition of the previous paragraph. For the two-player game with the privately
informed seller, we know that as  ! 1, the price converges toH and trade takes place almost
immediately. Thus, in the limit, the reservation price of the informed seller is H, regardless
of her type. This suggests that, for high enough ;we can use the results of the benchmark
case to construct equilibrium strategies in which the o¤ers to both the sellers tend to H: This
turns out to be true, though constructing such an equilibrium involves careful analysis of
beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Incidentally, [8] show in an environment similar to this that,
if buyers made o¤ers sequentially rather than simultaneously, there would be an equilibrium
2The Coase conjecture relevant here is the bargaining version of the dynamic monopoly problem,
namely that if an uninformed seller (who is the only player making o¤ers) has a valuation strictly below
the informed buyers lowest possible valuation, the unique sequential equilibrium as the seller is allowed to
make o¤ers frequently, has a price that converges as the frequency of o¤ers becomes innite to the lowest
buyer valuation. Here we show that even if one adds endogenous outside options for both players, a similar
conclusion holds for an equilibrium that is common to both public and private o¤ers-hence an extended
Coase conjecture holds.
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in which the second buyer to move would get a strictly higher payo¤ than the rst and that
the limiting behaviour would be di¤erent from the simultaneous o¤ers extensive form of this
paper. ([8] also has one-sided o¤ers by buyers only.)
The result of this paper is not conned to uncertainty described by two types of seller.
Even if the informed sellers valuation is drawn from a continuous distribution on [L;H], we
show that the asymptotic convergence to H still holds.
There could be other equilibria where essentially the buyers tacitly collude on o¤ers.
The previous analysis assumed that the goods themselves were of identical quality. In
this paper, we also consider a simple two-period game to show what happens when we have
quality-di¤erentiated goods, that is, the buyers value is a function of the sellers type. Here
the general convergence result does not necessarily hold, though if the probability of aH type
of seller is su¢ ciently low, the o¤er made to the informed seller goes to H as the discount
factor goes to 1.
Related literature: The modern interest in this approach dates back to the seminal
work of Rubinstein and Wolinsky ( [33], [34]), Binmore and Herrero ([5])and Gale ([16]),[17]).
These papers, under complete information, mostly deal with random matching in large
anonymous markets, though Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) is an exception. Chatterjee
and Dutta ([7]) consider strategic matching in an innite horizon model with two buyers
and two sellers and Rubinstein bargaining, with complete information. In a companion
paper (Chatterjee-Das 2011 [6]), we analyse markets under complete information where the
bargaining is with one-sided o¤ers.
There are several papers on searching for outside options, for example, Chikte and Desh-
mukh ([12]), Muthoo ([27]), Lee ([26]), Chatterjee and Lee ([11]). Chatterjee and Dutta ([8])
study a similar setting as this paper but with sequential o¤ers by buyers.
A rare paper analysing outside options in asymmetric information bargaining is that by
Gantner([21]), who considers such outside options in the Chatterjee-Samuelson ([10]) model.
Our model di¤ers from hers in the choice of the basic bargaining model and in the explicit
analysis of a small market with both public and private targeted o¤ers. (There is competition
for outside options too, in our model but not in hers.)
Some of the main papers in one-sided asymmetric information bargaining are the well-
known ones of Sobel and Takahashi([36]), Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole ([14]), Ausubel and
Deneckere ([2]). The dynamic monopoly papers mentioned before are the ones by Gul and
Sonnenschein ([22]) and Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson([23]). See also the review paper of
Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere ([3]).
There are papers in very di¤erent contexts that have some of the features of this model.
For example, Swinkels [38] considers a discriminatory auction with multiple goods, private
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values (and one seller) and shows convergence to a competitive equilibrium price for xed
supply as the number of bidders and objects becomes large. We keep the numbers small, at
two on each side of the market. Hörner and Vieille [25] consider a model with one informed
seller, two buyers with correlated values who are the only proposers and both public and
private o¤ers. They show that, in their model unlike ours, public and private o¤ers give very
di¤erent equilibria; in fact, public o¤ers could lead to no trade.
Outline of rest of the paper. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section
2 discusses the model in detail. The qualitative nature of the equilibrium and its detailed
derivation is given in section 3. The asymptotic characteristics of the equilibrium are ob-
tained in Section 4. Section 5 analyses a model where the informed sellers valuation is
drawn from a continuous distribution on [L;H] and Section 6 discusses the possibility of
other equilibria. An analysis with a simple two period game to show what happens when
we have quality-di¤erentiated goods is done in Section 7 and nally Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Players and payo¤s
The setup we consider has two uninformed homogeneous buyers and two heterogeneous
sellers. Buyers (B1 and B2 ) have a common valuation of v for the good (the maximum
willingness to pay for a unit of the indivisible good). There are two sellers. Each of the
sellers owns one unit of the indivisible good. Sellers di¤er in their valuations. The rst seller
(SM) has a reservation value of M which is commonly known. The other seller (SI) has a
reservation value that is private information to her. SIs valuation is either L or H, where,
v > H > M > L
We assume that L = 0; for purposes of reducing notation. It is commonly known by all
players that the probability that SI has a reservation value of L is  2 (0; 1). It is worthwhile
to mention that M 2 [L;H] constitutes the only interesting case. If M < L (or M > H)
then one has no ambiguity about which seller has the lowest reservation value. Although
our model analyses the case of M 2 (L;H), the same asymptotic result will be true for
M 2 [L;H] ( even though the analytical characteristics of the equilibrium for  < 1 are
di¤erent).
Players have a common discount factor  2 (0; 1). If a buyer agrees on a price pj with
seller Sj at a time point t, then the buyer has an expected discounted payo¤ of 
t 1(v  pj).
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The sellers discounted payo¤ is t 1(pj   uj), where uj is the valuation of seller Sj.
2.2 The extensive form
This is an innite horizon, multi-player bargaining game with one sided o¤ers and discount-
ing. The extensive form is as follows:
At each time point t = 1; 2; ::; o¤ers are made simultaneously by the buyers. The o¤ers
are targeted. This means an o¤er by a buyer consists of a sellers name (that is SI or SM) and
a price at which the buyer is willing to buy the object from the seller he has chosen. Each
buyer can make only one o¤er per period. Two informational structures will be considered;
one in which each seller observes all o¤ers made ( public targeted o¤ers) and one ( private
targeted o¤ers) in which each seller observes only the o¤ers she gets. (Similarly for the
buyers after the o¤ers have been made-in the private o¤ers case each buyer knows his own
o¤er and can observe who leaves the market.) A seller can accept at most one of the o¤ers
she receives. Acceptances or rejections are simultaneous. Once an o¤er is accepted, the trade
is concluded and the trading pair leave the game. Leaving the game is publicly observable
(irrespective of public or private o¤ers). The remaining players proceed to the next period
in which buyers again make price o¤ers to the sellers. As is standard in these games, time
elapses between rejections and new o¤ers.
3 Equilibrium
We will look for Perfect Bayes Equilibrium[15] of the above described extensive form. This
requires sequential rationality at every stage of the game given beliefs and the beliefs being
compatible with Bayesrule whenever possible, on and o¤ the equilibrium path. The PBE
obtained is stationary in the sense that the strategies depend on the history only to the
extent to which it is reected in the updated value of  (the probability that SIs valuation
is L). Thus at each time point buyerso¤ers depend only on the number of players remaining
and the value of . The sellersresponses depend on the number of players remaining, the
value of  and the o¤ers made by the buyers.
3.1 The Benchmark Case: Complete information
Before we proceed to the analysis of the incomplete information framework we state the
results of the above extensive form with complete information. A formal analysis of the
complete information framework has been done in a companion paper.
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Suppose the valuation of SI is commonly known to be H. In that case there exists a
stationary equilibrium (an equilibrium in which buyers o¤ers depend only on the set of
players present and the sellersresponses depend on the set of players present and the o¤ers
made by the buyers) in which one of the buyers (say B1) makes o¤ers to both the sellers
with positive probability and the other buyer (B2) makes o¤ers to SM only. Suppose E(p)
represents the expected maximum price o¤er to SM in equilibrium. Assuming that there
exists a unique pl 2 (M;H) such that,
pl  M = (E(p) M)3
, the equilibrium is as follows:
1. B1 o¤ers H to SI with probability q. With the complementary probability he makes
o¤ers to SM . While o¤ering to SM , B1 randomises his o¤ers using an absolutely continuous
distribution function F1(:) with [pl; H] as the support. F1 is such that F1(H) = 1 and
F1(pl) > 0. This implies that B1 puts a mass point at pl.
2. B2 o¤ers M to SM with probability q
0
. With the complementary probability his o¤ers
to SM are randomised using an absolutely continuous distribution function F2(:) with [pl; H]
as the support. F2(:) is such that F2(pl) = 0 and F2(H) = 1.
Appendix(A) establishes the existence and uniqueness of pl.
The outcome implied by the above equilibrium play constitutes the unique stationary
equilibrium outcome. It is shown in [6] that, as  ! 1,
q ! 0 , q0 ! 0 and pl ! H
This means that as market frictions go away, we tend to get a uniform price in di¤erent
buyer-seller matches. In this paper, we show a similar asymptotic result even with incomplete
information, with somewhat di¤erent analysis.
3.2 Equilibrium of the one-sided incomplete information game
with two players
The equilibrium of the whole game contains the analyses of the di¤erent two-player games
as essential ingredients. If a buyer-seller pair leaves the market after an agreement and the
other pair remains, we have a continuation game that is of this kind. We therefore rst
review the features of the two-player game with one-sided private information and one-sided
3Given the nature of the equilibrium it is evident that M(pl) is the minimum acceptable price for SM
when she gets one(two) o¤er(s).
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o¤ers.
The setting is as follows: There is a buyer with valuation v; which is common knowledge.
The sellers valuation can either be H or L where v > H > L = 0. At each period,
the remaining buyer makes the o¤er and the remaining (informed) seller responds to it by
accepting or rejecting. If the o¤er is rejected then the value of  is updated using Bayes
rule and the game moves on to the next period when the buyer again makes an o¤er. This
process continues until an agreement is reached. The equilibrium of this game(as described
in, for example, [13]) is as follows.
For a given  we can construct an increasing sequence of probabilities, d() = f0; d1; :::::; dt; ::::g
so that for any ~ 2 (0; 1) there exists a t  0 such that ~ 2 [dt; dt+1). Suppose at a particular
time point the play of the game so far and BayesRule implies that the updated belief is
. Thus there exists a t  0 such that  2 [dt; dt+1). The buyer then o¤ers pt = tH.
The H type seller rejects this o¤er with probability 1. The L type seller rejects this o¤er
with a probability that implies, through BayesRule, that the updated value of the belief
u = dt 1. The cuto¤ points dts are such that the buyer is indi¤erent between o¤ering
tH and continuing the game for a maximum of t periods from now or o¤ering t 1H and
continuing the game for a maximum of t  1 periods from now. Thus here t means that the
game will last for at most t periods from now. The maximum number of periods for which
the game can last is given by N(). It is already shown in [13] that this N() is uniformly
bounded by a nite number N as  ! 1.
Since we are describing a PBE for the game it is important that we specify the o¤-path
behavior of the players. First, the o¤-path behavior should be such that it sustains the
equilibrium play in the sense of making deviations by the other player unprotable and
second, if the other player has deviated, the behavior should be equilibrium play in the
continuation game, given beliefs. We relegate the discussion of these beliefs to appendix (B).
Given a , the expected payo¤ to the buyer vB() is calculated as follows:
For  2 [0; d1), the two-player game with one-sided asymmetric information involves the
same o¤er and response as the complete information game between a buyer of valuation v
and a seller of valuation H. Thus we have
vB() = v  H for  2 [0; d1)
For  2 [dt; dt+1); (t  1 ), we have,
vB() = (v   tH)a() + (1  a())(vB(dt 1)) (1)
where a() is the equilibrium acceptance probability of the o¤er tH.
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These values will be crucial for the analysis of the four-player game.
3.3 Equilibrium of the four-player game with incomplete infor-
mation.
We now consider the four-player game. The complete-information benchmark case suggests
that there will be competition among the buyers for the more attractive seller, in the sense
that that seller will receive two o¤ers with positive probability in equilibrium, whilst the
other seller will obtain at most one. However, the di¤erence arises here because of the
private information of one of the sellers. Even if one pair of players has left the market,
a seller with private information has some power arising from the private information. In
fact, for  high enough, this residual power of the informed seller leads, in equilibrium, to
competition taking place for the other seller (whose value is common knowledge), even if 
is relatively high. The main result of this paper is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a  2 (0; 1) such that if  > ; then for all  2 [0; 1) there
exists a stationary equilibrium as follows (both public and private o¤ers:):
(i) One of the buyers (say B1) will make o¤ers to both SI and SM with positive probability.
The other buyer B2 will make o¤ers to SM only.
(ii) B2 while making o¤ers to SM will put a mass point at p
0
l() and will have an absolutely
continuous distribution of o¤ers from pl() to p() where p
0
l() (pl()) is the minimum
acceptable price to SM when she gets one(two) o¤er(s). For a given , p() is the upper
bound of the price o¤er SM can get in the described equilibrium (p
0
l() < pl() < p()). B1
while making o¤ers to SM will have an absolutely continuous (conditional) distribution of
o¤ers from pl() to p(), putting a mass point at pl().
(iii) B1 while making o¤ers to SI on the equilibrium path behaves exactly in the same
manner as in the two player game with one-sided asymmetric information.
(iv) SIs behavior is identical to that in the two-player game. SM accepts the largest o¤er
with a payo¤ at least as large as the expected continuation payo¤ from rejecting all o¤ers.
(v) Each buyer in equilibrium obtains a payo¤ of vB().
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Remark 1 The mass points and the distribution of buyerso¤ers will depend upon  though
we show that these distributions will collapse in the limit. O¤ the path, the analysis is di¤er-
ent from the two-player game because the buyers have more options to consider when choosing
actions. For the description of o¤-path behavior refer to Appendix(C) and Appendix(D) for
public and private o¤ers respectively.
Remark 2 A road map of the proof: We construct the equilibrium by starting from the
benchmark complete information case and showing that the complete information strategies
essentially carry over to the game where  is in a range near 0. This includes, through
the competition lemma, showing the nature of the competition among the sellers. Once  is
outside this range, the mass points and support of the randomised strategies in the candidate
equilibrium will depend upon  and these are characterised for all values of : The equilibrium
is then extended beyond the initial range (apart from the initial range, these are functions of )
for su¢ ciently high values of  by recursion. Finally, checking that the candidate equilibrium
is immune to unilateral deviation at any stage involves specifying out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
This is done in the two appendices.
Proof. We prove this proposition in steps. (Not all of these steps are given here in order
to reduce unwieldy notation-see also the appendices.) First we derive the equilibrium for
a given value of  by assuming that there exists a threshold , such that if  exceeds this
threshold then for each value of , a stationary equilibrium as described above exists. Later
on we will prove this existence result.
To formally construct the equilibrium for di¤erent values of , we need the following
lemma which we label as the competition lemma, following the terminology of [8], though
they proved it for a di¤erent model.
Consider the following sequences for t  1:
pt = v   [(v   tH)+ (1  )(v   pt 1)] (2)
p
0
t =M + (1  )(pt 1  M) (3)
where  2 (0; 1) and p0 = H.
Lemma 1 There exists a 







pt   p0t = v   [(v   tH)+ (1  )(v   pt 1))] M
 (1  )(pt 1  M)
= (v  M)(1   + )  (v   tH)
= (1  )(v  M) + (v   M   v + tH)
= (1  )(v  M) + (tH   M   (1  )v)
If we show that the second term is always positive then we are done. Note that the
coe¢ cient of  is increasing in delta and is positive at  = 1. Take t = N, where N is
the upper bound on the number of periods up to which the two player game with one sided
asymmetric information (as described earlier) can continue. For t = N, 9 0 < 1 such that
the term is positive whenever  > 
0
. Since this is true for t = N, it will be true for all
lower values of t.




whenever  > 
0
.
For both public and private targeted o¤ers, the equilibrium path is the same. However
the o¤-path behavior di¤ers (to be specied later).
Fix a  > . Suppose we are given a  2 (0; 1)4. There exists a t  0 (it is easy to see
that this t  N ) such that  2 [dt; dt+1). The sequence d () = f0; d1; d2; :::dt::g is derived
from and is identical with the same sequence in the two-player game. Next, we evaluate
vB() (from the two player game). Dene p() as,






l() =M + (1  a())[Edt 1(p) M ] (4)
where Edt 1(p) represents the expected price o¤er to SM in equilibrium when the probability
that SI is of the low type is dt 1. From (4) we can posit that, in equilibrium, p
0
l() is the
minimum acceptable price for SM if she gets only one o¤er.
4 = 0 is the complete information case with a H seller.
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Lemma 2 For a given  > d1, the acceptance probability a() of an equilibrium o¤er is
increasing in  and has a limit a() which is less than 1.
Proof. The acceptance probability a() of an equilibrium o¤er is equal to (), where
() is the probability with which the L-type SI accepts an equilibrium o¤er. From the
updating rule we know that () is such that the following relation is satised:
(1  ())
(1  ()) + (1  ) = dt 1




Therefore, () is increasing in  and decreasing in dt 1. From [13] the dt are decreasing in
 and have a limit. Hence () (and also a() ) is increasing in . Since the dt have a limit
as  goes to 1, so does (). Therefore, a() also has a limit a() which is less than 1 for
 2 (0; 1).
For  = dt 1, the maximum price o¤er to SM (according to the conjectured equilibrium)
is p(dt 1). This implies that Edt 1(p) < p(dt 1) (this will be clear from the description
below). Since a() 2 (0; 1), from lemma (1) we can infer that p() > p0l(). Suppose there
exists a pl() 2 (p0l(); p()) such that,
pl() = (1  )M + E(p)
We can see that pl represents the minimum acceptable price o¤er for SM in the event that
he gets two o¤ers. (Note that if SM rejects both o¤ers, the game goes to the next period
with  remaining the same.)
From the conjectured equilibrium behavior, we derive the following5 :
1. B1 makes o¤ers to SI with probability q(), where
q() =
vB()(1  )
(v   p0l())  vB()
(5)
B1 o¤ers 
tH to SI . With probability (1  q()) he makes o¤ers to SM . The conditional dis-
tribution of o¤ers to SM ; given B1 makes an o¤er to this seller when the relevant probability




F 1 (s) =
vB()[1  (1  q())]  q()(v   s)
(1  q())[v   s  vB()] (6)
We can check that F 1 (pl()) > 0 and F

1 (p()) = 1. This conrms that B1 puts a mass
point at pl().
2. B2 o¤ers p
0







(v   pl()))  vB() (7)
With probability (1  q0()) he makes o¤ers to SM by randomizing his o¤ers in the support
[pl(); p()]. The conditional distribution of o¤ers is given by
F 2 (s) =
vB()[1  (1  q0())]  q0()(v   s)
(1  q0())[v   s  vB()] (8)
This completes the derivation. Appendix(C) and Appendix(D)(for public and private
o¤ers respectively) describes the o¤-path play and show that it sustains the equilibrium play
in each of the cases.
Next, we show that there exists a  such that 
0
<  < 1 and for  >  an equilibrium
as described above exists for all values of  2 [0; 1). To do these we need the following
lemmas:
Lemma 3 If  2 [0; d1), then the equilibrium of the game is identical to that of the bench-
mark case.
Proof. From the equilibrium of the two player game with one sided asymmetric information,
we know that for  2 [0; d1), buyer always o¤ers H to the seller and the seller accepts this
with probability one. Hence this game is identical to the game between a buyer of valuation
v and a seller of valuation H, with the buyer making the o¤ers. Thus, in the four-player
game, we will have an equilibrium identical to the one described in the benchmark case. We
conclude the proof by assigning the following values:
p
0
l() =M and p() = H for  2 [0; d1)
Lemma 4 6If there exists a  2 (0 ; 1) such that for    and for all t 2 f1; :::; Ng an
6We use the following notation, from the appendix. For any x 2 (M;H) Ex(p) be the expressions obtained
from F1(:), F2(:), q, q
0
and E(p) respectively by replacing pl by x.
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equilibrium exists for  2 [0; dt()), then there exists a t   such that, for all  2 (t ; 1)
an equilibrium also exists for  2 [dt(); dt+1()).
Proof. We only need to show that there exists a t   such that for all  > t and for all
 2 [dt(); dt+1()),there exists a pl() 2 (p0l(); p()) with
pl() = (1  )M + E(p)
From now on we will write dt instead of dt(). For each  2 (0 ; 1) we can construct d()
and the equilibrium strategies as above (assuming existence). Construct the function G(x)
as
G(x) = x  [Ex(p) + (1  )M ]
We can infer from Appendix (A) that the function G(:) is monotonically increasing in x.

















 (p) > p
0
l(). So for  = 1, G(p
0
l())) < 0. Since G(:) is a continuous
function, there exists a t   such that for all  > t , G(p0l())) < 0. By invoking the
Intermediate Value Theorem we can say that there is a unique x 2 (p0l(); p()) such that
G(x) = 0. This x is our required pl().
This concludes the proof.
From lemma (3) we know that for any  2 (0; 1) an equilibrium exists for  2 [0; d1).7




We can do this because N is nite. Lemma (3) and (4) now guarantee that whenever  > 
an equilibrium as described above exists for all  2 [0; 1) .
This concludes the proof of the proposition.
7Note that d1 is independent of 
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4 Asymptotic characterization
It has been argued earlier that as  ! 1, p0l() reaches a limit which is less than p(). From
(5) we then have,
q()! 0 as  ! 1
Then from (6) we have,
1  F 1 (s) =
p()  s
(1  q())[v   s  vB()]
We have shown that q()! 0 as  ! 1. Hence as  ! 1, for s arbitrarily close to p(), we
have
1  F 1 (s) 
p()  s
p()  s = 1
Hence the distribution collapses and pl()! p(). From the expression of pl() we know
that pl()! E(p) as  goes to 1. Thus we can conclude that E(p) approaches p(). From
the two-player game with one-sided asymmetric information we know that as  goes to 1,
p()! H; (since vB() goes to v H) for any value of . This leads us to conclude that as
 goes to 1, E(p)! H for all values of . This in turn provides the justication of having
Edt 1(p)  Ex(p) for high values of (used in the proof of lemma (4)).
From the proof of lemma (4) we know that G(p()) > 0. Hence there will be a threshold
of  such that for all  higher than that threshold we have G(p()) > 0. Thus pl() is









Since pl() is bounded above by p(), q
0
()! 0 as  goes to 1.
Thus we conclude that as  goes to 1, prices in all transactions go to H. We state this
(informally) as a result.
Main result: With either public or private o¤ers there exists a stationary Perfect-Bayes
equilibrium, such that, as  ! 1; the prices in both transactions go to H. The bargaining
ends almost immediately and both sellers, the one with private information and L type
and the one whose valuation is common knowledge, obtain strictly positive expected prots.
Comment : It should be mentioned that we would expect the same result to be true, if,
instead of a two-point distribution, the informed types reservation value s is continuously
distributed in [L;H] according to some cdf G(s). The following section describes this.
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5 Informed sellers reservation value is continuously
distributed in [L;H ]
Suppose the informed sellers valuation is continuously distributed on [L;H] according to
some cdf G(s). As before, we rst consider the two player game with a buyer and a seller,
where the seller is informed.
5.1 Two-player Game
There is one buyer, whose valuation is commonly known to be v.
There is one seller, whose valuation is private information to her. Her valuation is
distributed according to a continuous distribution function G(:), over the interval [L;H].
Let g(:) be the density function which is assumed to be bounded:
0 < g  g(s)  g
Players discount the future using a common discount factor  2 (0; 1).
We now state the equilibrium of the innitely repeated bargaining game where the buyer
makes o¤ers in each period. The seller either accepts or rejects it. Rejection takes the game
to the next period, when the buyer again makes an o¤er.
The result re-stated below (for completeness) is from [14] .
One can show that at any instant, the buyers posterior distribution about the sellers
valuation can be characterised by a unique number se, which is the lowest possible valuation
of the seller. With a slight abuse of terminology, we will call se the buyers posterior.
The Equilibrium: Given a  2 (0; 1); we can obtain thresholds sts, such that L < st <
H and
st < st 1 < :::: < s2 < s1
If at a time point t, the posterior st 2 (st+1; st], then the buyer o¤ers pt. A seller with
valuation less than st 1 accepts the o¤er. Rejection takes the posterior to st 1.
The pts are such that the seller with a valuation st 1 is indi¤erent between accepting
the o¤er now or waiting until the next period. The o¤-path behavior of players is outlined
in appendix (E).
It can be shown that as  ! 1, for all t, pt ! H. Also the maximum number of periods
for which the game would last is bounded above by N.
16
5.2 Four-player game
We now analyse the four player game. There are two buyers, each with a valuation v. There
are two sellers. One of them has a valuation which is commonly known to be M . The
other sellers valuation is private information to her. It is continuously distributed in [L;H];
according to some cdf G(:) as discussed above.
First we prove an analogue of the competition lemma. From the two-player game, we
know that the number of periods for which the game with one-sided asymmetric information
would last is bounded above by N:
Lemma 5 For t  1; :::; N, dene pt and p0t as
pt = v   [(v   pt)+ (1  )(v   pt 1)]
p
0
t =M + (1  )(pt 1  M)
where  2 (0; 1) and p0 = H.
Then there exists 





pt   p0t = v   [(v   pt)+ (1  )(v   pt 1)]
 M   (1  )(pt 1  M)
= (1  )(v  M) + [pt   M   (1  )v]
The rst term is always positive. Let us consider the second term. Consider t = N. The
coe¢ cient of  is positive for  = 1. This is because pt ! H as  ! 1. Since this is true for
t = N, it will be true for all lower values of t.
This concludes the proof.
For each  2 (0; 1) we can nd a t such that s 2 (st+1; st]. The sequence fst+1; st; :::; s3; s2g
is derived from and is identical with the same sequence in the two player game. Given these,
we can evaluate vB(s) as






For s > s2, vB(s) = v  H.
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Dene p(s) as,
p(s) = v   vB(s)
As before, we rst conjecture an equilibirum and derive it and then prove existence. We
refer to the seller with known valuation as SM and the one with private information as SI .
The following proposition describes the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists a  2 (0; 1) such that if  > ; then for all s 2 (L;H) there
exists a stationary perfect Bayesequilibrium as follows:
(i) One of the buyers (say B1) will make o¤ers to both SI and SM with positive probability.
The other buyer B2 will make o¤ers to SM only.
(ii) B2 while making o¤ers to SM will put a mass point at p
0
l(s) and will have an
abosolutely continuous distribution of o¤ers from p
0
l(s) to p(s) where p
0
l(s) (pl(s)) is the
minimum acceptable price to SM when she gets one (two) o¤er(s). For a given s, p(s) is the
upper bound of the price o¤er SM can get in the described equilibrium (p
0
l(s) < pl(s) < p(s)).
B1 while making o¤ers to SM will have an absolutely continuous (conditional) distribution
of o¤ers from pl(s) to p(s), putting a mass point at pl(s).
(iii) B1 while making o¤ers to SI on the equilibrium path behaves exactly in the same
manner as in the two player game with one-sided asymmetric information.
(iv) Each buyer obtains a payo¤ of vB(s).
(Out-of-equilibrium analysis is contained in appendix (F) and (G) for public and private
o¤ers respectively.)






l(s) =M + (1  (s))[Est 1(p) M ]
where (s) = 1 F (s
t 1)
1 F (s) .
This is the minimum acceptable price for SM , when she gets only one o¤er. Since
Est 1(p)  pt 1, from lemma (5) we can say that p(s) > p0l(s).
Suppose there exists a pl(s) 2 (p0l(s); p(s)) such that
pl(s) =M + (Es(p) M)
We can now derive the equilibrium as conjectured.
Now we shall prove existence with the help of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6 If s 2 (s2; 1], then the equilibrium is identical to that of the benchmark case
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Proof. From the equilibrium of the two player game with one-sided asymmetric information
we know that the buyer always o¤ersH to the seller, who accepts it with probability 1. Thus,
in the four player game, we will have an equilibrium identical to the one described in the
benchmark case.
Lemma 7 If there exists a  2 (0 ; 1) such that for    and for all t 2 f1; :::; Ng an
equilibrium exists for s 2 (st; 1], then there exists a t   such that, for all  2 (t ; 1) an
equilibrium also exists for s 2 (st+1; st].
We relegate the proof of this lemma to appendix (H).
The proof of the proposition now follows from lemma (6) and lemma (7).
6 A non-stationary equilibrium
We show that with public o¤ers we can have a non-stationary equilibrium, so that the
equilibrium constructed in the previous sections is not unique. This is based on using the
stationary equilibrium as a punishment (the essence is similar to the pooling equilibrium with
positive prots in [28]). The strategies sustaining this are described below. The strategies
will constitute an equilibrium for su¢ ciently high ; as is also the case for the stationary
equilibrium.
Suppose for a given , both the buyers o¤er M to SM . SM accepts this o¤er by selecting
each seller with probability 1
2
. If any buyer deviates, for example by o¤ering to SI or making
a higher o¤er toM; then all players revert to the stationary equilibrium strategies described
above. If SM gets the equilibrium o¤er of M from the buyers and rejects both of them
then the buyers make the same o¤ers in the next period and the seller SM makes the same
responses as in the current period.
Given the buyers adhere to their equilibrium strategies, the continuation payo¤ to SM
from rejecting all o¤ers she gets is zero. So she has no incentive to deviate. Next, if one
of the buyers o¤ers slightly higher than M to SM then it is optimal for her to reject both
the o¤ers. This is because on rejection next period players will revert to the stationary
equilibrium play described above. Hence her continuation payo¤ is (E(p)  M);which is
higher than the payo¤ from accepting.
Finally each buyer obtains an equilibrium payo¤ of 1
2
(v   M) + 1
2
vB(). If a buyer
deviates then, according to the strategies specied, SM should reject the higher o¤er if the
payo¤ from accepting it is strictly less than the continuation payo¤ from rejecting(which is
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the one period discounted value of the payo¤ from stationary equilibrium). Hence if a buyer





= E(p) + (1  )M
The payo¤ of the deviating buyer will then be (v   E(p)) + (1   )(v  M). As  ! 1,
(v   E(p)) + (1  )(v  M)  (v   p() + (1  )(v  M)
= vB() + (1  )(v  M).




vB(), as (v M) > vB().
Hence for su¢ ciently high values of  this will also be true. Also if a buyer deviates and
makes an o¤er in the range (M; p
0
) then it will be rejected by SM . The continuation payo¤
of the buyer will then be vB() < 12(v  M) + 12vB(). Hence we show that neither buyer
has any incentive to deviate.
We conclude this section by noting that this is not an equilibrium for private o¤ers. This
is because we have di¤erent continuation play for buyers and sellers deviations. For public
o¤ers these deviations are part of the public history. However for private o¤ers they are not.
7 Quality Di¤erentiated Goods
Throughout our analysis this far, we have assumed that each seller possess a non-di¤erentiated
good. In other words, a buyers valuation for the good does not depend on the identity of the
seller selling it. We now allow for quality-di¤erentiated goods. This implies that a buyers
valuation for a good depends on the sellers type. If the valuation of a seller is j, then the
buyersvaluation for this sellers good is denoted by vj.
7.1 The Environment
There are two buyers and two sellers. One of the sellersvaluations is common knowledge
and is equal to M . The other sellers valuation is private information to her. It is known
that with probability , SIs valuation is H and with the complementary probability it is L,
such that,
H > M > L
Buyers are homogeneous and their valuation for the good depends on the sellers valuation.
It is vj for the good sold by the seller with valuation j. We have,
vH > vM > vL > H and
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vH  H > vM  M > vL   L
8
As before, we consider a bargaining game where the buyers simultaneously make o¤ers.
O¤ers are targeted.
7.2 One-period game
First we try to determine the equilibrium of the one-period game. O¤ers to the informed
seller can be of two types. One is the pooling type, which is accepted by both types of SI .
The other is the one that is only targeted to the L-type SI .
To begin with, we try to see if there is an equilibrium where one of the buyers (B1 say)
makes a pooling o¤er to SI and the other buyer B2 makes an o¤er only to SM . It is easy
to observe that any pooling o¤er p
0  H. Also, in an equilibrium as conjectured above, we
must have p
0
= H, B2s o¤er to SM equal to M and,
vH + (1  )vL  H = vM  M
)  = H  M + vM   vL
vH   vL = 

Hence only for  = , can we have an equilibrium as conjectured above.
If  > , then
vH + (1  )vL  H > vM  M
This shows that there will be competition for the informed seller.
Hence B2 with some probability would like to make o¤ers to SI . This implies that the
o¤ers to SI will be randomised. The lower bound of the support is H and the upper bound
is p0, such that
vH + (1  )vL   p0 = vM  M
Let F1(:) be the distribution of o¤ers by B1 to SI , and F2(:) be the distribution of o¤ers
by B2 to SI , conditional on B2 making o¤ers to SI . Let q be the probability with which B2
makes o¤ers to SM . Then for s 2 (H; p0], B1s indi¤erence condition gives us
[vH + (1  )vL   s][q + (1  q)F2(s)] = vM  M
) F2(s) = (vM  N)  q[vH + (1  )vL   s]
(1  q)[vH + (1  )vL]
8Clearly, some assumption has to be made about the relative sizes of the surplus. We have focused on
one.
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B2s indi¤erence condition gives us
[vH + (1  )vL   s]F1(s) = vM  M
) F1(s) = vM  M
[vH + (1  )vL   s]
We obtain the value of q by putting s = H in B1s indi¤erence condition. It can be veried
that F1(H) > 0 ; F1(p0) = 1 and F2(H) = 0 ; F2(p0) = 1.
Hence B1 puts a mass point at H.
Now consider the case when  < . We have
vH + (1  )vL  H < vM  M
Also for  > H L
vH L = 
,
vH + (1  )vL  H > (1  )(vL   L)
Since  < , for  2 [; ), competition will be for seller SM . B1 will make o¤ers to
both SM and SI . B2 will make o¤ers to SM only. O¤ers to SM will be randomised in the
range [M; pm] where
vH + (1  )vL  H = vM   pm
B1; while making o¤ers to SI ;makes the pooling o¤er ofH. The analytical characteristics
of this equilibrium can be found in the same way as done for  > .
If  < , then again competition is for the seller SM . However now, B1 while making
o¤ers to SI o¤ers L, i.e targets the L-type SI . The support of o¤ers to SM will be [M; pml ]
where
(1  )[vL   L] = vM   pml
7.3 Two-period game
Let us now consider the two-period game. Players discount the future using a common
discount factor . We now nd a perfect Bayesequilibrium of this two-period game. We
will show that in this case, prices in all transactions do not go to the same value. However
we do show that when competition is for the known-valued seller, as people become patient
enough, the price in the transaction with the informed seller goes to H, irrespective of the
likelihood of the informed seller being the H-type.
First of all consider  > . As explained above, competition will be for the informed
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seller. However, now the continuation payo¤ to SI by rejecting an o¤er, when she gets one
o¤er di¤ers from that by rejecting all o¤ers, when she gets two o¤ers. If EI(p) is the expected
equilibrium price to SI from the one period game when competition is for SI , then in period
1, if she gets two o¤ers, her minimum acceptable price is:
pi = EI(p) + (1  )H
Hence B1 makes o¤ers to SI only. He puts a mass point at H and randomises his o¤ers in
the range [pi; p0] according to a continuous distribution F1(:). B2 with probability q, makes
o¤ers to SM . With probability (1 q), he randomises his o¤ers in the range [pi; p0] according
to a continuous distribution F2(:). F2(:) puts a mass point at pi. The expressions for F1(:),
F2(:) and q can be obtained from the indi¤erence conditions of the buyers.
Now consider  < , i.e when competition is for the seller SM . In the two-period game,
the nature of putting mass points while making o¤ers to SM in period 1 remains the same
as in the previous paragraph.
In the one period game we have seen that for low values of , o¤ers to SI are targeted to
the L-type. The reservation value of the L-type was L. However, in the two-period game,
when the competition is for SM , the reservation value of the L-type in the rst period game
is higher than L. This is because if the L-type rejects an o¤er in the rst period then next
period she would face a two-player game with a buyer and the buyer would perceive her as
a H-type seller. Thus next period her price o¤er will be H. This implies that if pl is the
minimum acceptable price, then we have
pl   L = (H   L)
) pl = H + (1  )L
Thus when competition is for SM , it is optimal to target the L-type only if
vH + (1  )vL  H < (1  )[vL   (H + (1  )L)]
)  > (1  )[H   L]
vH   (H + (1  )L) = l(say)
Observe that as  ! 1, pl ! H and l ! 0. Hence for high values of , the price o¤ered
to the informed seller goes to H, irrespective of the value of .
Let us interpret the result we obtain in this two-period game. Consider the case when
competition is for the known-valued seller. Then we see that as  goes to 1, competition
is always for the seller SM and the price o¤ered to the informed seller goes to H. Also
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competition for SM tends to raise the upper bound of the price o¤ered to her. However, it
does not necessarily go to H. This depends on . This is because the expected valuation by
making o¤ers to SI depends on the value of ; because of quality di¤erentiation. Hence the
upper bound of the price o¤ers to SM is determined by  and it is not necessarily equal to
H. This dispersion is attributable to quality di¤erentiation.
8 Conclusion
In the model we described above we have shown that with either public or private o¤ers
there exists a stationary PBE, such that, as  ! 1; the prices in both transactions go to
H. The bargaining ends within the rst two periods and both sellers, the one with private
information and L type and the one whose valuation is common knowledge, obtain strictly
positive expected prots. This equilibrium is reminiscent of the Coase Conjectureon the
rents from private information dominating the rents from having the sole right to make o¤ers,
if the o¤ers can be made more and more quickly. However, the setting is di¤erent, in that
there is an endogenous outside option for which buyers compete, and the model contains a
potential interaction between this competition and the private information bargaining. This
interaction comes through, at least in the equilibrium we study, mainly in the analysis of
out-of-equilibrium behavior. It is interesting that the equilibrium path behavior is almost,
though not quite, separable along these two dimensions.
It is also interesting that the equilibrium path in our model is essentially the same with the
two di¤erent observability structures of public o¤ers and private o¤ers. We were somewhat
hesitant to use the name PBE for the private o¤ers case, since this is not a multistage game
with observable actions and private information, in the sense of Fudenberg and Tirole, but
the spirit of the analysis is very similar to theirs, so we have retained their name.
One question that might arise is how robust is our conclusion to di¤erent bargaining
extensive forms. Clearly, simultaneous o¤ers is best to represent competition and one-sided
o¤ers to represent the power to make o¤ers. If we go to alternating o¤ers, previous results
in the complete information setting indicate that we cannot expect the same results. This
is also true in the two-player setting, so the market element in the current model is not the
driver for this di¤erence.
We have shown that there could be non-stationary equilibria in this model. However,
we have not been able to demonstrate an analogue to the uniqueness result for two-person
bargaining with one-sided o¤ers and one-sided private information, even for stationary equi-
libria.
We have also considered extensions to a continuum of seller types and quality di¤erenti-
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ation (or buyer values being determined by informed seller types for that sellers good). The
continuum of types does not a¤ect the result. The example with correlation does.
In our future research we intend to address the issue of having two privately informed
sellers and to extend this model to more agents on both sides of the market.
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Appendix
A Existence and uniqueness of pl
For any x 2 (M;H); let F x1 (:), F x2 (:), qx , q0x, and Ex(p) be the expressions obtained from
F1(:), F2(:), q, q
0
and E(p) respectively by replacing pl by x. Thus all we need to show is
that there exists a unique x 2 (M;H) such that,
x  M = (Ex(p) M)
Note that,
Ex(p) = qx[q
0xM + (1  q0x)Ex2 (p)]
+(1  qx)[q0xEx1 (p) + (1  q
0x)E(highest o¤er)]
where, Exi (p) is derived from F
x
i (:), i = 1; 2.







We prove this using the following steps:
(i) From the expression obtained for q
0
we can say that q
0x9 is increasing in x.
(ii) Next we show that as we raise x by 1 unit, there is an increase in Ex2 (p) by less than
1 unit.
Increasing x by 1 unit means raising the lower bound of support of F x2 (:) by 1 unit. Thus
we need to show that
Ex+12 (p) < E
x
2 (p) + 1
Consider the distribution ~F x2 (:) with [x+ 1; H + 1] as the support such that,
~F x2 (s) = F
x
2 (s  1)
Let gEx2 (p) be the expectation obtained under ~F x2 (s) . Thus,
9This is done in the companion paper. q
0
is equal to [v H](1 )(v pl) (v H)
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gEx2 (p) = Z H+1
x+1
s d ~F x2 (s)
) gEx2 (p) = [Z H+1
x+1








(s) dF x2 (s)] + 1
= Ex2 (p) + 1
F x+12 (p) is obtained from ~F
x
2 (s) by transferring the mass from the interval (H;H + 1] to
[x + 1; H], i.e transferring mass from higher quantities to lower quantities.. Thus it is clear
that,
Ex+12 (p) <
gEx2 (p) = Ex2 (p) + 1
By similar reasoning we can say that ,
Ex+11 (p) < E
x
1 (p) + 1




Now we dene the function G(:) as,
G(x) = x  [Ex(p) + (1  )M ]
Di¤erentiating G(:) w.r.t x we get,
G
0
(x) = 1  @E
x(p)
@x





From the equilibrium strategies, we know that M < Ex(p) < H for any x 2 (M;H). Since
 2 (0; 1) we have,
lim
x!M
G(x) < 0 and lim
x!H
G(x) > 0
Since G(:) is a continuous and monotonically increasing function, using the Intermediate
Value Theorem, we can say that there exists a unique x 2 (M;H) such that,
G(x) = 0
) x = Ex(p) + (1  )M
This x is our required pl.
Thus we have,
G(pl) = 0
) pl = (1  )M + E(p)
B O¤-path behavior of the 2 player game with incom-
plete information
We recapitulate here the o¤-path beliefs that sustain the equilibrium we have discussed
for the two-player game. Suppose, for a given  and ; the equilibrium o¤er is tH(i.e
 2 [dt; dt+1) ) .We need to consider the following o¤-path contingencies.
(a) The buyer o¤ers po to the seller such that po < tH: If p0 < t+1H then both the
L-type and H-type seller reject this o¤er with probability 1. If po 2 [t+1H; tH) then the
L-type seller rejects this with a probability, which, through Bayes rule, implies that the
updated belief is dt. Let this probability be 
00





(p). The H-type seller always rejects this o¤er. Since po 2 [t+1H; tH);
there exists a k 2 (0; 1] such that po = kt+1H+(1 k)tH. Next period (if the seller rejects
now) the buyer o¤ers tH with probability k and t 1H with probability (1   k). This is
optimal from the point of view of the buyer because at  = dt, the buyer is indi¤erent
between o¤ering tH and t 1H. Also the expected continuation payo¤ to the L-type seller
from rejection is equal to (ktH + (1  k)t 1H) = po. Thus the L-type seller is indi¤erent
between accepting and rejecting the o¤er of po.
The way the cuto¤s dts are derived ensures that the buyer has no incentive to deviate
and o¤er something less than tH.
30
(b) Next, consider the case when the buyer o¤ers po to the seller such that po > tH.
If po 2 (tH; t 1H], the L-type seller rejects this o¤er with a probability that takes the
updated belief to dt 1. Since po 2 (tH; t 1H], there exists a k 2 (0; 1], such that po =
kt 1H + (1   k)tH. If the seller rejects then next period the buyer o¤ers t 2H with
probability k and t 1H with probability 1   k. This is optimal from the buyers point of
view since at  = dt 1, the buyer is indi¤erent between o¤ering 
t 1H and t 2H. Since the
expected payo¤ to the L-type seller from rejection is (kt 2H + (1   k)t 1H) = po, he is
indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting an o¤er of po. As po is strictly greater than tH
and the acceptance probability is the same as that of the equilibrium o¤er, the buyer has no
incentive to deviate and o¤er po to the seller where po 2 (tH; t 1H].
If po 2 ( ;  1] (for   t   1 ) then the L-type seller rejects this with a probability
which through Bayesrule implies that the updated belief is d 1. If the seller rejects then
next period the buyer randomises between o¤ering  1H and  2H such that the expected
continuation payo¤ to the L-type seller from rejection is po. It can be checked that the buyer
has no incentive to deviate and o¤er po where po 2 ( ;  1] (  t  1 ).
C O¤-path behavior of the 4 player game with incom-
plete information(public o¤ers)
Suppose B2 adheres to his equilibrium strategy. Then the o¤-path behavior of B1 and that
of L-type SI , while B1 makes an o¤er greater than 
tH to SI ; are the same as in the 2-player
game with incomplete information. If B1s o¤er to SI is less than 
tH then the o¤-path
behavior of the L-type SI is described in the following manner. If B2s o¤er to SM is in the
range [pl(); p()], then the L-type SI behaves in the same way as in the 2-player game. If
B2 o¤ers p
0
l() to SM then the L-type SI accepts the o¤er with the equilibrium probability
so that rejection takes the posterior to dt 1. Next period, B1 randomises between dt 1 and
dt 2 so that the L-type SI is indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting the o¤er now. For
high values of , B1 has no incentive to deviate.
Next, suppose B2 makes an unacceptable o¤er to SM ; (which is observable to SI) and
B1 makes an equilibrium o¤er to SI . The L-type SI rejects this o¤er with a probability that
takes the updated belief to dt 1. If SI rejects this equilibrium o¤er and next period both the
buyers make o¤ers to SM , then two periods from now, the remaining buyer o¤ers 
t 2H (the
buyer is indi¤erent between o¤ering t 1H and t 2H at  = dt 1) to SI . Thus the expected
continuation payo¤ to SI from rejection is (q(dt 1)
t 1H + (1   q(dt 1))t 2H) = tH.
This implies that the L-type SI is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting an o¤er of 
tH
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if he observes SM to get an unacceptable o¤er.
Now consider the case when B2 deviates and makes an o¤er to SI . It is assumed that if
SI gets two o¤ers then she disregards the lower o¤er.
Suppose B1 makes an equilibrium o¤er to SI and B2 deviates and o¤ers something less
than tH to SI . SIs probability of accepting the equilibrium o¤er (which is the higher o¤er
in this case) remains the same. If SI rejects the higher o¤er (which in this case is the o¤er
of tH from B1 ) and next period both the buyers make o¤ers to SM , then two periods from
now, the remaining buyer o¤ers t 2H to SI .
If B2 deviates and o¤ers po 2 (tH; t 1H] to SI , then SI rejects this with a probability
that takes the updated belief to dt 2. If SI rejects this o¤er then next period if B1 o¤ers to
SI , he o¤ers 
t 2H. If both B1 and B2 make o¤ers to SM then two periods from now the
remaining buyer randomises between o¤ering t 2H and t 3H to SI (conditional on SI being
present). Randomisations are done in a manner to ensure that the expected continuation
payo¤ to SI from rejection is po. It is easy to check that for high values of , this can
always be done. Lastly, if B2 deviates and o¤ers to SI and B1 o¤ers to SM (according to his
equilibrium strategy), then the o¤-path specications are the same as in the 2-player game
with incomplete information.
We will now show that B2 has no incentive to deviate. Suppose he makes an unacceptable
o¤er to SM . His expected discounted payo¤ from deviation is given by,
D = q()[fa()(v  M) + (1  a())vB(dt 1)g] + (1  q())vB() (9)
From (4) we know that,
p
0
l() < M + (1  a())[p(dt 1) M ]
as Edt 1 < p(dt 1). Hence we have,
p
0
l() < M + (1  a())[(v  M)  (v   p(dt 1))]
Rearranging the terms above we get,
(v   p0l()) > fa()(v  M) + (1  a())vB(dt 1)g+ (1  )(v  M) (10)
By comparing (9) and (10) we have,
q()(v   p0l()) + (1  q())vB() > D
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The L.H.S of the above relation is B2s equilibrium payo¤, as he puts a mass point at p
0
l().
Hence he has no incentive to make an unacceptable o¤er to SM .
Next, suppose B2 deviates and makes an o¤er of po to SI such that po 2 (tH; t 1H].




() is the probability with which B2s o¤er is accepted by SI in the event when both
B1 and B2 make o¤ers to SI and B2s o¤er is in the range (
tH; t 1H]. From our above
specication it is clear that a
0
() > a(), where a() is the acceptance probability of an
equilibrium o¤er to SI . This is also very intuitive. In the contingency when B1 makes an
equilibrium o¤er to SM andB2s out of the equilibrium o¤er to SI is in the range (
tH; t 1H],
the acceptance probability is equal to a(), the equilibrium acceptance probability. In this
case if the L-type SI rejects an o¤er then next period he will get an o¤er with probability 1.
However if both B1 and B2 make o¤ers to SI and B2s o¤er is in the range (
tH; t 1H] then
the L-type SI accepts this o¤er with a higher probability. This is because, on rejection, there




Since po > p
0
l()




v   p0l() > (v   po)a
0
() + (1  a0())vB(dt 2) (11)
Also, since po > tH, we have
(v   po)a() + (1  a())vB(dt 1) < vB()
The expression [(v po)a()+(1 a())vB(dt 1) vB()] is strictly negative for  = 1. From
continuity, we can say that for su¢ ciently high values of , (v po)a()+(1 a())vB(dt 1) <
vB(). This implies that,
(v   p0l())q() + (1  q())vB() >  H
The L.H.S of the above inequality is the equilibrium payo¤ of B2. Similarly if B2 deviates
and make an o¤er to SI such that his o¤er p0 is in the range [
t+1H; tH), the payo¤ from
10For su¢ ciently high values of  this will always be the case.





 L = q()[fa()(v  M) + (1  a())vB(dt 1)g]
+(1  q())[(v   p0)a00() + (1  a00())vB(dt)]
>From the 2-player game we know that [(v p0)a00()+(1 a00())vB(dt)] < vB(). Also
from the previous analysis we can posit that (v p0l()) > fa()(v M)+(1 a())vB(dt 1)g.
Thus for su¢ ciently high values of , (v   p0l())q() + (1  q())vB() >  L.
Hence B2 has no incentive to deviate and make an o¤er to SI .
D O¤-path behavior with private o¤ers
The o¤-path behavior described in the preceding appendix is not applicable to the case of
private o¤ers. This is because it requires the o¤ers made by both the buyers to be publicly
observable. The o¤-path behavior of the players in the case of private o¤ers is described as
follows.
Specically we need to describe the behavior of the players in the following three contin-
gencies.
(i) B2 makes an unacceptable o¤er to SM .
(ii) B2 makes an o¤er of po to SI such that po < 
tH.
(iii) B2 makes an o¤er of po to SI such that po > 
tH.
We denote the above three contingencies byE1, E2 andE3 respectively. We now construct
a particular belief system that sustains the equilibrium described in the text.
Suppose B1 attaches probabilities ,
2 and 3 (0 <  < 1 ) to E1, E2 and E3 respectively.
Thus he thinks that B2 is going to stick to his equilibrium behavior with probability [1  
(+ 2 + 3)].
If E1 or E2 occurs and B1 makes an equilibrium o¤er to SI , then SIs probability of
accepting the equilibrium o¤er remains the same and two periods from now (conditional on
the fact that the game continues until then), if B2 is the remaining buyer he o¤ers 
t 2H
to SI . If E3 occurs and all players are observed to be present, then next period B2 o¤ers
p(dt 1) to SM . In any o¤-path contingency, if B1 is the last buyer remaining (two periods
from now) then he o¤ers t 2H to SI .
The L-type SI accepts an o¤er higher than 
tH with probability 1 if she gets two o¤ers.
If she gets only one o¤er then the probability of her acceptance of out-of-equilibrium o¤ers
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is the same as in the two-player game with incomplete information.
We will now argue that the o¤-path behavior constitutes a sequentially optimal response
by the players to the limiting beliefs as ! 0.
Suppose B1 makes an equilibrium o¤er to SI and it gets rejected. Although o¤ers are
private, each player can observe the number of players remaining. Thus, next period, if
B1 nds that all four players are present he infers that this is due to an out-of-equilibrium
play by B2. Using Bayes rule he attaches the following probabilities to E1, E2 and E3
respectively.
1
1 + + 2
to E1

1 + + 2
to E2
2
1 + + 2
to E3
As  ! 0, the probability attached to E1 goes to 1. Thus B1 believes that his equilibrium
o¤er of tH to SI was rejected and the updated belief is dt 1. In the case of E1 or E2 the
beliefs of B1 and B2 coincide. However, in the case of E3 they di¤er. Suppose E3 occurs and
B1s equilibrium o¤er to SI gets rejected. Then next period all four players will be present
and given L-type SIs behavior, the belief of B2 will be  = 0 and that of B1 will be  =
dt 1. In that contingency it is an optimal response of B2 to o¤er p(dt 1) to SM since he
knows that B1 is playing his equilibrium strategy with the belief dt 1.
Next we will argue that the L-type SI nds it optimal to accept an o¤er higher than 
tH
with probability 1, if she gets two o¤ers. This is because in the event when she gets two
o¤ers she knows that rejection will lead the buyer B1 to play according to the belief dt 1 and,
two periods from now, the remaining buyer will o¤er t 2H to SI . Thus her continuation
payo¤ from rejection is
ft 1Hq(dt 1) + (1  q(dt 1))t 2Hg = ft 1Hg = tH
Hence she nds it optimal to accept an o¤er higher than tH with probability 1.
We need to check that B2 has no incentive to deviate and make an o¤er of po to SI such
that po > tH.
Suppose B2 deviates and makes an o¤er of po to SI such that po > 
tH. With probability
q(), SI will get two o¤ers and B02s will be accepted with probability . With probability
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(1  q()), SI will get only one o¤er. B2 then gets a payo¤ of
(v   po)q() + (1  q())[(v   po)a() + (1  a())vB(dt 1)]
As shown in the previous appendix, for high values of  we have (v   po)a() + (1  




vB() = (v   p0l())q() + (1  q())vB()
> (v   po)q() + (1  q())[(v   po)a() + (1  a())vB(dt 1)]
Hence B2 has no incentive to deviate and make an o¤er of po to SI .
Lastly, to show that B2 has no incentive to deviate and make an unacceptable o¤er to
SM or o¤er p0 to SI such that p0 < 
tH we refer to the analysis in the previous appendix.
E O¤-path behavior for the 2-player game where the
informed sellers valuation is drawn from a continu-
ous distribution
Suppose the buyer makes an o¤er of p0 such that p0 > pt. We will show that for any
p0 2 (pt; pt 1), the buyer will have no incentive to o¤er p0. By denition, we have,
pt 1   st 2 = (pt 2   st 2)) pt 1   st 1 > (pt 2   st 1)
since st 1 < st 2. Also,
pt   st 1 = (pt 1   st 1)) pt   st 1 < (pt 2   st 1)
since pt 2 > pt 1. This implies that there exists a  2 (0; 1) such that
pt 1 + (1  )pt   st 1 = (pt 2   st 1)
Any p0 2 (pt; pt 1) can be written as p0 = pt 1 + (1  )pt, where  2 (0; 1).
If  <  then rejection takes the posterior to st 1. The buyer following a rejection
randomises between pt 1 and pt 2 such that the seller with valuation st 1 is indi¤erent
between accepting the o¤er of p0 or rejecting it. Since  < , such a randomisation is always




possible. Also for the buyer, he is o¤ering a higher price and it is getting accepted with the
equilibrium probability.
If  >  then rejection takes the posterior to s
0 2 (st 1; st 2) and the buyer next period
o¤ers pt 2. Here s
0
is such that the seller with such a valuation is indi¤erent between
accepting the o¤er of p0 or rejecting it. Since  > ,
p0   st 1 > (pt 2   st 1)
Also from denition, one can show that
p0   st 2 < (pt 2   st 1)
This shows that such a s
0
exists.
Now, suppose the buyer o¤ers some price p0 such that p0 < pt. We will show that for
any p0 2 (pt+1; pt); the buyer will have no incentive to deviate. For any p0 2 (pt+1; pt), there
exists a  2 (0; 1) such that p0 = pt + (1  )pt+1. By denition, we have
pt+1   st = [pt   st]
pt   st > [pt   st]
Hence
p0   st > [pt   st]
Again by denition,
pt+1   st = [pt   st] < [pt 1   st]
pt   st 1 = [pt 1   st 1]) pt   st > [pt 1   st]
Hence there exists a  2 (0; 1) such that
pt + (1  )pt+1   st = [pt 1   st]
Thus if  < , then rejection takes the posterior to st. Next period the buyer randomises
between o¤ering pt and pt 1.
If  > , then rejection takes the posterior to some s
0 2 (st; st 1) such that a seller with
valuation s
0
is indi¤erent between accepting the o¤er of p0 or to reject it. As before it can




F Out-of-equilibrium behavior for the 4-player game
where the informed sellers valuation is drawn from
a continuous support (public o¤ers)
We only describe the following two o¤-path deviations. Others are analogous to the ones with
the case where the informed sellers valuation is drawn from a distribution with two-point
support.
First, suppose B2 makes an unacceptable o¤er to SM (i.e less than p
0
l(s)) and B1 makes
an equilibrium o¤er to SI . Then rejection of the equilibrium o¤er by SI still takes the
posterior to st 1. However, next period, if B1 o¤ers to SI , then he randomises between
o¤ering pt 1 and pt 2. If next period, both the buyers o¤er to SM , then two periods from
now, the remaining buyer randomises between o¤ering pt 1 and pt 2 to SI . Note that when
the posterior is st 1, the buyer is indi¤erent between o¤ering pt 1 and pt 2.
The payo¤ to the seller with valuation st 1 from accepting an equilibrium o¤er now is
(pt   st 1). Hence randomisations by the buyers in the subsequent periods should ensure
that the continuation payo¤ to the seller with valuation st 1 from rejecting the equilibrium
o¤er is also (pt   st 1): We will now show that for high values of , such a randomisation is
always possible.
 cl (the minimum continuation payo¤ to the seller with valuation s
t 1; i.e an o¤er of pt 1
in the next period and two periods from now.) is given as,
 cl = [q(s
t 1)(pt 1   st 1) + (1  q(st 1))(pt 1   st 1)]
= [pt 1   st 1][q(:) + (1  q(:))] = (pt   st 1)[q(:) + (1  q(:))] < (pt   st 1)
(since by denition, pt   st 1) = [pt 1   st 1]. This is true for all  < 1)
 ch (the maximum continuation payo¤ to the seller with valuation s
t 1; i.e an o¤er of pt 2
in the next period and two periods from now) is given as,
 ch = [q(s
t 1)(pt 2   st 1) + (1  q(st 1))(pt 2   st 1)]
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= [(pt 2   st 1)(q(st 1) + (1  q(st 1)))]
> [(pt 1   st 1)(q(st 1) + (1  q(st 1)))]
(since pt 2 > pt 1 )
= (pt   st 1)(q(st 1) + (1  q(st 1)))
For  = 1 we have  ch  (pt   st 1) (since q(:) ! 0; as  ! 1). This is because the
inequality is strictly maintained when  < 1; and is not reversed when  ! 1 (as pt 2 > pt 1
by denition) . Then by continuity we can say that for high values of ; we will have
 ch > (p
t   st 1) . Also, we have  cl < (pt   st 1). Hence on the equilibrium o¤er being
rejected by the informed seller, o¤ers to SI can be made by randomising between pt 1 and
pt 2 in a manner, such that the seller with valuation st 1 is indi¤erent between accepting
and rejecting the o¤er now. In the same way as done in the case of discrete valuations of
the informed seller, one can show that the buyer B2 has no incentive to deviate and make
an unacceptable o¤er to SM .
Next, suppose B1 makes an equilibrium o¤er to SI and B2 deviates and makes an o¤er
of p0 to SI , such that p0 < pt. Then the informed seller disregards the lower o¤er. Rejection
takes the posterior to st 1. Thereafter buyersbehavior in making o¤ers to SI is exactly the
same as described above.
Finally, suppose B2 deviates and makes an o¤er of p0 > pt to SI and B1 makes an
equilibrium o¤er to SI . Then rejection takes the posterior to st 1. We will show that for
high values of , the buyer can always randomise between o¤ering pt 1 and pt 2 in the next
and subsequent periods (if there is no o¤er to SI in the next period), such that the seller
with valuation st 1 is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er.
Any o¤er p0 2 (pt; pt 1) is a convex combination of pt and pt 1. It is already shown above
that the minimum continuation payo¤ to SI with valuation st 1,  cl < p
t   st 1. Also,
 ch = [q(s
t 1)(pt 2   st 1) + (1  q(st 1))(pt 2   st 1)]
= [(pt 2   st 1)(q(st 1) + (1  q(st 1)))]
> [(pt 1   st 1)(q(st 1) + (1  q(st 1)))]
Since the inequality is strictly maintained for  < 1 and not reversed when  ! 1, we
have
 ch  pt 1   st 1
for  = 1. Then by continuity we can posit that for high values of ; we will have  ch >
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pt 1   st 1.
Hence the suggested randomisation is possible.
G Out-of-equilibrium behavior for the 4-player game
where the informed sellers valuation is drawn from
a continuous support (private o¤ers)
Specically we need to describe the behavior of the players in the following three contingen-
cies:
(i) B2 makes an unacceptable o¤er to SM .
(ii) B2 makes an o¤er of po to SI such that po < pt.
(iii) B2 makes an o¤er of po to SI such that po > pt.
We denote the above three contingencies byE1, E2 andE3 respectively. We now construct
a particular belief system that sustains the equilibrium described in the text.
SupposeB1 attaches probabilitites , 
2 and 3 (0 <  < 1) to E1, E2 and E3 respectively.
Thus he thinks that B2 is going to stick to his equilibrium behavior with probability (1  
(+ 2 + 3)).
If E1 or E2 occurs and B1 makes an equilibrium o¤er to SI , then SIs probability of
accepting the equilibrium o¤er remains the same. On observing that all four players are
present, the common posterior of the buyers will be st 1. In the subsequent periods when
o¤ers are made to SI , randomisations between pt 1 and pt 2 are done in a manner to ensure
that the continuation payo¤ to the informed seller with valuation st 1 is (pt   st 1) . If E3
occurs and all players are observed to be present, then next period B2 o¤ers p(st 1) to SM .
If the informed seller gets two o¤ers, she accepts an o¤er p0 > pt with probability 1 as





p0   s0 = pt   st 1
If she gets only one o¤er then the probability of her acceptance of out-of-equilibrium o¤ers
is the same as in the two-player game with incomplete information.
We will now argue that the o¤-path behavior constitutes a sequentially optimal response
by the players to the limiting beliefs as ! 0.
Suppose B1 makes an equilibrium o¤er to SI and it gets rejected. Although o¤ers are
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private, each player can observe the number of players remaining. Thus, next period, if B1
nds that all four players are present, he infers that this is due to an out-of-equilibrium
play by B2. Using Bayes rule he attaches the following probabilities to E1, E2 and E3
respectively.
1
1 + + 2
to E1

1 + + 2
to E2
2
1 + + 2
to E3
As  ! 0, the probability attached to E1 goes to 1. Thus B1 believes that his equilibrium
o¤er of pt to SI was rejected and the updated belief is st 1. In the case of E1 or E2 the
beliefs of B1 and B2 coincide. However, in the case of E3; they di¤er. Suppose E3 occurs and
B1s equilibrium o¤er to SI gets rejected. Then next period all four players will be present
and given SIs behavior, the belief of B2 will be s
0
> st 1 such that
p0   s0 = pt   st 1
where p0 > pt is the out of equilibrium o¤er made by B2 to SI (This in turn implies that the
behavior of the informed seller in the contingency E3 is optimal).
This is because the belief of B1 is st 1 and B2; from the subsequent period onwards,
plays according to B1s belief. In the subsequent periods while o¤ers are being made to SI ,
randomisations between pt 1 and pt 2 are done in a manner to ensure that the continuation
payo¤ to SI is pt   st 1. As before it is easy to observe that B2 nds it optimal to play
according to B1s belief, since B2s belief (s
0
) is greater than that of B1 (st 1) .
In the same way as done in the case of discrete valuations of the informed seller, we can
show that B2 will not deviate.
H Proof of lemma (7)
Proof. We only need to show that there exists a t   such that for all  > t and for all
s 2 (st+1; st] ,there exists a pl(s) 2 (p0l(s); p(s)) with
pl() = (1  )M + Es(p)
From now on we will write st instead of st(). For each  2 (0 ; 1) we can construct d()
and the equilibrium strategies as above (assuming existence). Construct the function G(x)
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as
G(x) = x  [Exs (p) + (1  )M ]
We can infer from Appendix (A) that the function G(:) is monotonically increasing in x.

















 (p) > p
0
l(s). So for  = 1, G(p
0
l())) < 0. Since G(:) is a continuous
function, there exists a t   such that for all  > t , G(p0l())) < 0. By invoking the
Intermediate Value Theorem we can say that there is a unique x 2 (p0l(); p()) such that
G(x) = 0. This x is our required pl().
This concludes the proof.
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